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AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 
1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental 
protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means 
by which the earth's fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been 
recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of lEAs. As such, in this 
paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of lEAs. Very generally, 
I propose that we frame the lEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then 
be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies to generate 
interesting new theoretical and practical insights into the workings of IEAs. 
JEL Classification: D73, D82, L50 
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AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
1. Introduction 
A particular line of western social thought suggests that the rational pursuit of self interest 
by individual actors is likely to lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. While this line of 
thinking has had a powerful influence on western social thinking for quite some time, it is important 
to recognize that it runs ". . . counter to some of the most powerful findings produced by social 
scientists working in .. .international relations." (Young 1989, p. 1). Indeed, in the area of 
international relations, the pursuit of self interest, in the absence of effective institutions and rules is 
more likely than not". . . to produce collective outcomes that are socially undesirable ... " (Young 
1989, p. 2). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of international environmental relations. 
At various international forums, l developing and developed countries have repeatedly clashed over 
global environmental problems, in large part because of the manner in which these countries have 
construed the causes, nature, and solutions to such problems. 
This suboptimal state of affairs and the fact that ". . . the cooperation required to solve 
collective actton problems [of an environmental nature] .. .is elusive in the world of international 
relations ... " (Young 1989, p. 3), suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hope to bring 
about international cooperation in an inherently noncooperative setting. There is not much dispute 
among scholars about the relevance of international cooperation. Indeed, as Maurice Strong (1990, 
p. 211) has argued, the " ... need for international cooperation is inescapable." Once such a need is 
recognized, three pertinent research questions arise. 
lSee Rogers (1993) or Grubb et al. (1993). 
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First, given that institutions". . . can be important factors in protecting the environment . . ." 
(Keohane, Haas, and Levy 1993, p. 7), what can economic theory tell us about the design of 
international environmental agreements (lEAs) which will protect the world's fragile environmental 
resources? 
Second, what is the impact of national sovereignty on the efficacy of lEAs? More specifically, 
how do difficulties associated with monitoring and enforcement, which stem from respecting the 
principle of state sovereignty, affect the above mentioned design question? To what extent is 
Krasner's (1983a, p. 367) claim that sovereignty substantially weakens the position of international 
institutions and hence the attendant lEAs that such institutions may design, true? 
Third, given developing country demands that " ... the North ... radically assist the South 
in choosing a different road to development than the one [ the North has been] traveling on . . ." 
(Rogers 1993, p. 27), what is the impact of limited funds on the design of lEAs? Specifically, what 
are the properties of budget balanced lEAs which give rise to desirable levels of global pollution 
abatement? 
Given these three research questions, the general purpose of this paper is: (1) to discuss these 
design, sovereignty, and funding questions; (2) to propose a theoretical research agenda for studying 
the various issues raised by these three questions; and (3) to show how specific aspects and objectives 
of such a research agenda might be accomplished. Inter alia, depletion of the earth's ozone layer 
(Downing and Kates 1982; Parson 1993), destruction of tropical rainforest, and the attendant 
diminution in biodiversity (GadgiI1995; Perrings 1995) remind us that a thorough understanding of 
the issues described by these three questions is vital to the optimal, and presumably less fractious, use 
and management of the earth's environmental resources. 
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2. Three Key Research Questions Relating to lEAs 
As discussed briefly at the end of the previous section, the three key research questions 
significantly affecting the study of IEAs concern: (1) the design of IEAs in a noncooperative 
international environment, (2) an analysis of the effects of national sovereignty on this design 
question, and (3) a study of the effects of limited funds, i.e., a study of the properties of budget 
balanced IEAs. 
Analyses of the first question will shed light on what Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993, p. 281) 
have referred to as " ... the multi-faceted design ... problem .... " Specific issues that deserve 
research attention include the impact of ex ante versus ex post contracting on pollution abatement 
levels, the nature of the monetary transfers required to generate participation by national governments 
under alternate assumptions about the objectives of such governments, and the number of participants 
that are necessary before a meaningful IEA can be designed. 
The potentially deleterious effects of national sovereignty on this design question have been 
much discussed in recent times.2 Indeed, Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993, p. 6) have asked "How 
can international institutions, which necessarily respect the principle of state sovereignty, contribute 
to the solution of difficult global problems?" Research is needed to shed light on this and related 
sovereignty questions by formally modeling the effects of sovereignty. 
The third main question that I wish to focus on concerns the problems arising from the limited 
availability of funds for global environmental protection. Of particular interest are issues pertaining 
to: (1) the demands of southern governments that northern governments". . . radically assist the 
2For instance, see Krasner (1983b, pp. 16-18). 
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South in choosing a different road to development ... " (Rogers 1993, p. 27); and (2) the concern 
of northern governments that " ... they [will be] left carrying the main [financial] burden ... " (Guest 
1990, p. 11) of global environmental protection. 
The methods and techniques of game and mechanism design theory can be used to formally 
model the three questions discussed above. The application of such methods and techniques to study 
these issues is still in its infancy. As such, research which uses these methods will attain at least two 
objectives and thereby contribute substantially to our understanding of global environmental 
protection issues. 
First, because of the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the underlying IEA design question, 
my research agenda explicitly recognizes the need for studying the role of sovereign national 
governments and their economic actions jointly. As such, the conduct of research along the lines 
suggested in this paper will contribute to the environmental economics literature and the nascent, 3 
largely narrative international relations and environmental politics4 literatures. 
Second, the results of this research can be used to better understand the complex and fractious 
use and management issues relating to the world's environment. Indeed, such comprehension must 
be the basis forJproviding policy guidance about how one might go about remedying and improving 
current global environmental use and management practices. 
Clearly, these objectives are central to the question of international environmental protection. 
Given the increased concern about sustainable use of the world's environment and the international 
3See Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993, p. 6) or Bernauer (1995, p. 352) for a more detailed corroboration of this 
claim. 
4For more on this literature, see Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), Switzer (1994), and Wettestad (1994). 
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political battles over the apposite use of the environment, it is now more important than ever before 
to craft effective IEAs. Such action will, inter alia, enhance global welfare by ensuring that the joint 
gains from international cooperation are not left unrealized. 
3. Previous Research and this AgendaS 
I now briefly discuss the nascent formal literature on IEAs.6 There are two aspects of the 
underlying problem which deserve some comment at this stage. First, because nations are sovereign, 
an effectively crafted IEA must recognize (see Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993)) that such nations 
may not live up to their contractual commitments in accordance with international law. Further, in 
the event of a contractual breach, nations typically cannot be held legally liable in the same way that 
domestic entities can. Second, for an IEA to function effectively, it must, in some way, address the 
monitoring and enforcement aspects of the problem. However, as Burke, Legatski, and Woodhead 
(1975) and others have noted, sovereignty limits and, on occasion, altogether precludes international 
institutions from undertaking effective monitoring and enforcement measures. As such, it is desirable 
that an IEA account for this "monitoring and enforcement" difficulty endogenously. Barrett (1992, 
1994) has modeled IEAs as games between different countries. Although Barrett's analyses are not 
in the design framework, Barrett makes the important point that, for IEAs to work at all, they must 
be self enforcing. However, the thrust of this point is considerably diminished by Barrett's focus on 
identical countries, with no uncertainty. As a result, this line of inquiry is unable to address 
5In the rest of this paper. I shall use the terms IEA and contract interchangeably. 
6 Also see footnotes 3 and 4. 
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fundamental questions arising from: (1) asymmetrically held information, and (2) the heterogeneity 
of the participating countries. 
Hoel (1991, 1992) has addressed the implications of, in tum, unilateral emissions reduction 
by countries, and uniform emissions reduction by all countries. Hoel (1991, p. 69) shows that, inter 
alia, unilateral actions ". . . may . . . reduce global welfare . . ." by increasing the total emissions of 
pollutants. Hoel (1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions reduction policies in IEAs, 
showing that other policies yield higher levels of social welfare. 
Shogren, Baik:, and Crocker (1992, hereafter SBC), Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993, 
hereafter BLD), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993, hereafter CS), and Sandler and Sargent (1995, 
hereafter SS) have all addressed the question of the minimal number of nations needed to sustain an 
IEA In a multiplayer strategic setting, SBC show that countries will sometimes join IEAs because 
the expected gains from such action outweigh the gains from not joining. However, beyond a critical 
threshold value, some countries will prefer to free ride and not join such an IEA, whereas the IEA 
members will want nonparticipants to join. BLD have explored this notion of a threshold value, 
which they call "the optimal ratification level." BLD show that this level is reasonably robust to 
variations in contractual circumstances; more significantly, BLD argue that the prospects for effecting 
an IEA are not necessarily diminished by there being a large number of countries. CS have provided 
a game theoretic analysis of the design of IEAs. They argue that partial cooperation can be used to 
design stable IEAs between subgroups of nations. However, CS show that if the number of 
participants to an IEA is to be increased, transfers and a minimum level of commitment by the various 
nations will be required. SS show that the attainment of international coordination by a 
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"minimal-sized group" is fundamentally dependent on ". . . how individual pollution activities add 
to the total pollutants experienced . . . [by nations]" (p. 152). 
While these papers have certainly advanced our understanding of some aspects of the lEA 
design problem, many other important questions remain unanswered. What kinds of pollution 
abatement patterns can one expect to observe in environments in which an imperfectly informed 
supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) contracts with governments and polluting firms in 
individual countries? What kinds of monetary transfers will be necessary to get sovereign nations to 
voluntarily participate in lEAs? What is the effect of ex ante versus ex post contracting on the nature 
of pollution abatement levels? How does the SNGA's inability to monitor pollution abatement in the 
individual countries affect the lEA design question? What are the effects of pollution ceiling 
constraints on the design of lEAs? Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the 
SNGA's IEA design task? 
These unanswered questions form the core of this paper's research agenda. I now discuss 
specific research methods and procedures which provide a framework within which the above 
described questions can be analyzed. 
4. Proposed Research Methods and Procedures 
The theory of games and the theory of incentives, as presented in Kreps (1990) or Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1991), have both advanced to a point where it is now possible to comprehensively model, 
analyze, and understand the issues that I have discussed in the previous two sections of this paper. 
Very generally, I propose that the lEA design question be studied as a problem in mechanism design. 
More specifically, I propose that the basic design question be modeled and analyzed as two different 
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kinds of principaVagent games. In the first proposed scenario, researchers can draw on the theory 
of common agency and focus attention on the interaction between two categories of players, i.e., a 
SNGA and national governments. In the second scenario, researchers can build on the theory of 
hierarchies and focus attention on the interaction between three categories of players, i.e., a SNGA, 
national governments and polluting firms in the different countries. 
4a. The Common Agency Scenario 
The theory of common agency7 is concerned with situations in which a single agent takes 
actions which affect the welfare of several principals. The preferences of the principals for the various 
possible actions typically conflict, and the agent has private information about some aspect of his 
actions. The key question concerns the kinds of contracts that the principals can design so as to 
induce desirable actions from the common agent. 
The simplest adaptation of this basic construct to the lEA design question involves the 
analysis of a model in which a developing country government and a developed country government 
(the two principals) interact with a SNGA (the common agent) responsible for undertaking actions 
to protect the global environment. 8 The two governments contribute funds with which the SNGA 
undertakes its actions, and the SNGA has private information about the level of environmental quality 
that it would like to see arise. 
In this kind of setting, researchers will be able to answer many of the questions discussed in 
sections 2 and 3 of this paper. For instance, what level of global environmental quality arises, in turn, 
7See Baron (1985), Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986), Gal-Or (1991), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, 
pp.301-3). 
Brbis SNGA could be the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which was created in Agenda 21 at 
the Rio Earth Summit or the World Bank in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
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in a cooperative and in a noncooperative equilibrium? It is clear that monitoring and enforcement 
problems stemming from national sovereignty are not germane in an equilibrium in which the two 
governments cooperate. How are the equilibria of the cooperative and the noncooperative games 
affected by capping the funds contributed by the two governments? Finally, in this common agency 
setting, one can also explore the effects on the equilibrium of one government, possibly the developed 
country government, acting as a Stackelberg leader in its interactions with the second government 
and the SNGA. 
4b. The Hierarchy Scenario 
The very recent literature on the economics of hierarchies9 has extended the basic two-tier 
principal/agent construct to three tiers in which the second tier is occupied by an intermediary of 
some sort. The simplest such extension involves the analysis of a vertical structure consisting of a 
single fork, i.e., a single principal, a single intermediary, and a single agent. More involved extensions 
involve the analysis of a vertical structure with "many" forks. The "many" refers to many principals, 
many intermediaries, many agents, or a combination of these three possibilities. In the typical case, 
this tripartite interaction is assumed to be characterized by the existence of private information at the 
level of intermediaries and! or agents. 
To see how this hierarchy scenario can be used to model the design of IEAs, consider the 
following conceptual framework. The world is represented by a n forked, three-tiered hierarchy. 
Occupying the first tier is the relevant SNGA (principal).10 The second and third tiers of the 
9See Tirole (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), and Batabyal (1995). 
lOAlso see footnote 8. 
10 
hierarchy consist of national governments (intermediaries) and representative polluting firms ( agents). 
The n forks represent the n countries which are a party to the IEA. Firms in the individual countries 
know the pollution abatement technology available to them (private information), national 
governments mayor may not acquire this private information, but the SNGA is never privy to this 
information. Hence, the problem is characterized by asymmetrically held information. Finally, the 
random variables representing the private information possessed by firms in each of the n countries 
can be modeled as being uncorrelated or correlated across countries. 
This framework can be used to answer a number of important questions about the design of 
IEAs. First, the above framework can be embedded in a static or a dynamic game of incomplete 
information. Once this has been done, one can determine the equilibrium pattern of pollution 
abatement across countries. Further, one can account for the sovereignty issue by disallowing the 
possibility of monitoring and enforcement and then analyzing IEAs which have been designed to 
preclude collusion between governments and firms in the individual countries. Finally, the impact of 
limited funds on the properties of the underlying game equilibrium can be studied by explicitly 
incorporating budget balance constraints, either in a weak ex ante sense, or in a strong ex post sense. 
Further, this conceptual framework can be extended to permit the inclusion of additional 
nuances such as relative performance evaluation by the SNGA. In an IEA involving relative 
performance evaluation, similar11 countries are held to similar contractual requirements and the 
requirements for one country-in a similar category of say two countries-are contingent on the 
requirements for the second country. In this way, the three issues discussed in sections 2 and 3 of 
this paper can be effectively analyzed. 
11 Similarity can be measured in many different ways. One possibility is to consider per capita GNP. 
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5. Conclusions 
I believe that the research agenda described in this paper will enable us to obtain a deep and 
thorough understanding of the many and varied intricacies of IEAs designed to protect the global 
environment. Further, because a key aim of this paper is to delineate a policy-oriented research 
agenda, I expect that the conduct of this kind of research will generate significant and implementable 
policy guidelines. 
Finally, it should not go unsaid that with talk of rising disparity between the developed world 
and the developing world and the increasingly fractious nature of international discussions regarding 
the use of environmental resources, the IEA design question discussed in this paper takes on 
particular significance. This is in no small measure due to the fact that the implementation of such 
mechanisms will do more to engender and maintain international security than will most unilateral or 
strategic policy measures. 
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